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(AT LEAST) THIRTEEN WAYS
OF LOOKING AT ELECTION LIES*
HELEN NORTON**
Lies take many forms. Because lies vary so greatly in their motivations
and consequences (among many other qualities), philosophers have long
sought to catalog them to help make sense of their diversity and
complexity. Augustine and Aquinas, for instance, separately proposed
moral hierarchies of lies based on their differing assessments of certain lies’
relative harm and value.1 Legal scholars too have classified lies in various
ways to explain why we punish some and protect others.2
* See WALLACE STEVENS, Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird, in THE
COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 99 (Vintage Int’l 2015) (1954).
** Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of
Colorado School of Law. Thanks to Jessica Reed-Baum for excellent research assistance, to
Josh Sellers, Joe Thai, and Jim Weinstein for thoughtful comments, and to the Oklahoma
Law Review for a terrific symposium.
1. Augustine, On Lying ¶ 25 (n.d.), in SEVENTEEN SHORT TREATISES OF S. AUGUSTINE,
BISHOP OF HIPPO 382, 408–09 (Charles Lewis Cornish & Henry Browne trans., Oxford, John
Henry Parker 1847), https://archive.org/details/seventeenshorttr00augu (describing eight
different types of lies, some more pernicious than others: lies in religious teaching, lies that
harm others and help no one, lies that harm others and help someone, lies told for the
pleasure of lying, lies told “with [the] desire of pleasing by agreeableness in talk,” lies that
harm no one and that help someone, lies that harm no one and that save someone’s life, and
lies that harm no one and that save someone’s “purity”); THOMAS AQUINAS, Opposed to
Truth: Of Lying, in THE “SUMMA THEOLOGICA” OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: PART II (SECOND
PART) 85, 90 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1922) (1485),
https://archive.org/details/summatheologicao12thomuoft (“Now it is evident that the greater
the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful
consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their
order of gravity: since the useful good is better than pleasurable good, and the life of the
body than money, and virtue than the life of the body.”).
2. I have taxonomized lies in other legal settings elsewhere. See Helen Norton, Lies to
Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Governmental Power, in LAW AND LIES 143
(Austin Sarat ed., 2015) [hereinafter Norton, Lies to Manipulate] (discussing lies to the
government, about being the government, and to become the government); Helen Norton,
Government Lies and the Press Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 453 (2018) (discussing the
government’s various press-related lies and misrepresentations); Helen Norton, Lies and the
Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 163–85 [hereinafter Norton, Lies and the
Constitution] (proposing that the First Amendment protects some lies because they have
affirmative value in their own right, some to prevent the chilling of valuable speech, some to
prevent government overreaching, and some not at all). For a sampling of other legal
commentators’ thoughtful taxonomies of lies, see, for example, Alan Chen & Justin
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In this Essay, I offer yet another taxonomy of lies, focusing specifically
on election lies—that is, lies told during or about elections.3 As we shall
see, we can divide and describe election lies in a wide variety of ways: by
speaker, by motive, by subject matter, by audience, by means of delivery,
and more. These different ways of thinking about election lies are by no
means mutually exclusive; indeed, they often overlap.
In this Essay, I use the term “lies” to mean a speaker’s deliberately or
recklessly false assertions of fact made with the intention that the listener
believe them to be true.4 But of course such “lies” themselves are a subset
of a larger category of deception that includes misrepresentations, secrets,
and more.5 I chose this narrower focus not only due to limitations of time
and space, but also because such intentional or reckless falsehoods may be
especially morally blameworthy in their disrespect for the listener and
because they may threaten greater instrumental harm than other forms of
deception.6
Election lies understandably disturb us when they succeed in deceiving
their targets, when they influence election outcomes, and when they
degrade our public discourse. At the same time, however, we also fear
Marceau, Developing a Taxonomy of Lies Under the First Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV.
655 (2018); David Han, Categorizing Lies, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 613 (2018).
3. Catherine Ross has recently offered an insightful taxonomy of campaign-related
deceptions that includes “straight-out lies,” “intentional distortions,” “bullshit,” and “indirect
prevarication.” Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth: Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarications,
Bullshit, and Straight-Out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 367
(2018). Other helpful discussions of election lies include Gerald G. Ashdown, Distorting
Democracy: Campaign Lies in the 21st Century, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1085 (2012);
Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections? 74 MONT. L.
REV. 53 (2013); William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 285 (2004).
4. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH & TRUTHFULNESS 96 (2002) (“I take a lie to be an
assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made with the
intention to deceive the hearer with regard to that content.”).
5. See Ross, supra note 3. Here I also distinguish election lies from campaign promises
sincerely made but later abandoned. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
780 (2002) (“[O]ne would be naïve not to recognize that campaign promises are—by long
democratic tradition—the least binding form of human commitment.”).
6. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts
Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 177 (2001)
(explaining that “bald-faced lies” may be more dangerous than other forms of deception
because they do not offer “the listener the opportunity for more precise questioning”); David
A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 356
(1991) (explaining that lies pose greater threats to listener autonomy than secrets because
they “affirmatively throw[] the hearer off track”).
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government overreach and the dangers of partisan enforcement, we worry
that regulation will inadvertently chill truthful and thus valuable speech,
and we sometimes wonder whether the causal link between election lies and
significant harm is sufficiently direct to justify the lies’ constraint.7
Hard constitutional questions arise when important values like electoral
integrity and free speech come into conflict.8 Indeed, in the related (but
distinct) context of campaign finance regulation, Professor Zephyr
Teachout describes a tension “between two different ideas of what is at the
center of the Constitution—the First Amendment or the integrity of the
electoral process.”9 These tensions, in turn, invite the question whether
electoral integrity simply requires a system free from corruption as
narrowly defined by the Supreme Court,10 or whether electoral integrity
instead sometimes affirmatively requires that election-related speech be
truthful.11
7. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 116
(2015) (describing a possible reluctance to regulate election-related lies because of the
greater difficulties in establishing a direct connection between those lies and their targets’
voting decisions given the many reasons for voters’ choices).
8. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (“Confidence in the integrity of our
electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.”).
9. ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 191 (2014); see also Deborah
Hellman, Liberty, Equality, Bribery, and Self-Government: Reframing the Campaign
Finance Debate 11 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper No.
2017–47, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028102 (“While it is
certainly true that speaking often requires money and that the liberty to speak freely is at
stake when laws limit political contributions and expenditures, this liberty is not the only
relevant liberty at issue in these cases. Also relevant is the liberty of self-government.”); id.
at 2 (“[W]hen courts consider whether campaign finance laws are constitutional, they should
remember that the equality of political participation and the liberty of self-government are
also important constitutional values that can be brought to bear, along with the liberty of free
speech, when deciding whether campaign finance restrictions can be upheld under current
law.”).
10. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360–61 (2010).
11. See James Weinstein, Free Speech and Domain Allocation: A Suggested Framework
for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Prohibition of Lies in Political Campaigns, 71 OKLA.
L. REV. 167, 222 (2018) (recommending that, in deciding whether an election-related lie
may be regulated, we ask “the extent to which the [regulation] advances the core purposes of
the election domain to promote fair and efficient elections” and “the extent to which the
[regulation] impairs the core democratic purposes of the domain of public discourse to
promote political legitimacy and to provide the public with useful information and
perspectives”); see also Frederick Schauer & Richard Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and
the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1816 (1999) (suggesting that elections are
sufficiently exceptional to justify the regulation of election-related speech in ways “that
would be impermissible in the general domain of public discourse”); id. at 1808 (“[W]e
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Spoiler alert: I do not propose to solve the knotty problem(s) of election
lies in this Essay. Instead, I identify some possible sorting mechanisms,
offer a few historical and contemporary illustrations, and suggest why these
distinctions among election lies might (or might not) matter when figuring
out what to do about them. I do not intend this as an exhaustive or perfect
taxonomy; indeed, I encourage others to improve upon it. By illuminating
the diversity and complexity of election-related lies, I emphasize the value
in thinking more carefully about what troubles us about them and why. In
so doing, I hope to help sharpen our thinking about when and why election
lies might be harmful or instead valuable; when and why their regulation
might threaten other harms; and when and why they might be amenable to
constraint through law, norms, markets, and architecture12—or not at all.
I. Differences Among Speakers
Election speakers—and thus election liars—vary widely: they may be
foreign or domestic, robot or human, governmental or nongovernmental,
members of a profession where speech is heavily regulated, and more.
A. Foreign Speakers
As we now know, Russian speakers perpetrated a range of falsehoods
during the 2016 U.S. election “as part of a strategy to influence public
opinion.”13 They not only disseminated speech that was false in content, but
also lied about the source of that speech by creating websites and social
media posts, profiles, and pages falsely attributed to nonexistent
Americans.14
could decide that elections constituted a distinct domain for First Amendment purposes
without committing to what we would do within that domain.”).
12. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–64
(1998) (describing how law, social norms, markets, and architecture each regulate human
behavior in different ways).
13. Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 71
(2017); see also Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269
(2018) (describing Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election). Of course, the United
States itself has sometimes interfered with other nations’ elections. E.g., BARBARA
TUCHMAN, Kissinger: Self-Portrait, in PRACTICING HISTORY 218, 223 (1981) (describing
then-Secretary of State Kissinger’s authorization of “expenditures by the Central Intelligence
Agency to influence the Chilean elections of 1970”).
14. See Elizabeth Dwoskin et al., Russians Took a Page from Corporate America by
Using Facebook Tool to ID and Influence Voters, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russians-took-a-page-from-corporateamerica-by-using-facebook-tool-to-id-and-influence-voters/2017/10/02/681e40d8-a7c5-
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Of course, foreign speakers may not have any autonomy interests
protected by the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court has held that at
least some constitutional guarantees do not extend to noncitizens
overseas.15 Even more important, foreign speakers’ lies to influence
American elections to their own advantage threaten especially grave harm
to key constitutional values—particularly if we understand the First
Amendment’s primary purpose as protecting speech that facilitates the
United States’ democratic self-governance.16 For related reasons, as
Professor Josh Sellers’s contribution to this symposium explains, federal
law already regulates campaign speech by foreign nationals in various ways
“to prevent foreign interference in our elections.”17

11e7-850e-2bdd1236be5d_story.html?utm_term=.9695ff239796 (“Russian operatives set up
an array of misleading Web sites and social media pages to identify American voters
susceptible to propaganda, then used a powerful Facebook tool to repeatedly send them
messages designed to influence their political behavior, say people familiar with the
investigation into foreign meddling in the U.S. election.”); Ellen Nakashima et al., Top U.S.
Intelligence Official: Russia Meddled in Election by Hacking, Spreading of Propaganda,
WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/topus-cyber-officials-russia-poses-a-major-threat-to-the-countrys-infrastructure-and-networks/
2017/01/05/36a60b42-d34c-11e6-9cb0-54ab630851e8_story.html?utm_term=.f46260a2d
2bc (“The country’s top intelligence official testified to Congress on Thursday that Russia’s
meddling in the 2016 presidential campaign went well beyond hacking to include
disinformation and the dissemination of ‘fake news’ – an effort, he said, that continues.”);
Scott Shane, Fake Facebook Accounts with Ties to the Kremlin Posed as U.S. Activists, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2017, at A16; Scott Shane, To Sway Vote, Russia Used Army of Fake
Americans: Flooding Twitter and Facebook, Imposters Helped Fuel Anger in Polarized
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2017, at A1.
15. E.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1990) (declining to
apply Fourth Amendment protections extraterritorially to noncitizens); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784–85 (1950) (declining to apply Fifth Amendment protections
extraterritorially to noncitizens). On the other hand, some resist such a limited view of the
Constitution’s reach. See Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective:
Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 1024 (2011) (urging courts
to consider a more robust understanding of First Amendment rights across borders).
16. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 24–25 (1948) (identifying democratic self-governance as the primary purpose
of the Free Speech Clause).
17. Joshua S. Sellers, Legislating Against Lying in Campaigns and Elections, 71 OKLA.
L. REV. 141, 155 (2018); see also 52 U.S.C. §§ 30121(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012) (prohibiting
foreign nationals from making monetary contributions to political candidates and political
parties); id. § 30121(a)(1)(C) (prohibiting foreign nationals from making independent
expenditures for certain electioneering communications).
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B. Robot Speakers
Robots, both foreign and domestic, also played a substantial role in
spreading “fake news”18 and other election-related lies in the 2016 U.S.
election.19 Nonhuman speakers have little, if any, protected autonomy
interests under the First Amendment (although humans are, of course,
behind their speech and, in any event, robots’ speech can still have value to
human listeners).20 Moreover, the robotic source of such lies can intensify
their speed and reach, and thus, perhaps, their harm.21
C. Corporate Speakers
Corporations also engage in election-related speech that can include lies.
Unlike human individuals, corporations do not have dignitary interests of
their own,22 although, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, listeners may
find value in political campaign speech regardless of its corporate origin.23
Corporations’ relative power and wealth may—or may not—trigger greater
concern about their ability to manipulate elections in various ways,

18. For thoughtful discussion of the related problem of “fake news,” see generally Lili
Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News,” 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232 (2018)
(discussing the related problem of “fake news”); Mark Verstraete et al., Identifying and
Countering Fake News (Univ. of Ariz., Ariz. Legal Stud., Discussion Paper No. 17-15,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007971.
19. See Persily, supra note 13, at 70 (“[B]ots can spread information or misinformation,
and can cause topics to ‘trend’ online through the automated promotion of hashtags, stories,
and the like. During the 2016 campaign, the prevalence of bots in spreading propaganda and
fake news appears to have reached new heights.”).
20. See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights for Artificial
Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2016) (explaining that the First Amendment
may protect robotic speech when it is of value to human listeners).
21. See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American
Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 222 (2018) (“But there is a danger that
counterspeech will not be enough to deal with the flood of bot-driven fake news making it
harder for voters with civic competence to separate truth from fiction and make informed
voting and policy choices. For this reason, the First Amendment should not be interpreted to
bar the government from enacting carefully drawn laws which would require social media
and search companies such as Facebook and Google to provide certain information to let
consumers judge the veracity of posted materials.”).
22. See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate
Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2015) (suggesting that the First
Amendment has been traditionally understood to protect corporations’ speech only to the
extent that it furthers human listeners’ interests because corporations do not have dignitary
interests of their own).
23. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349–50 (2010).
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including through their lies.24 Indeed, for related reasons election law
already treats corporations differently in certain ways: federal law, for
example, prohibits corporations from contributing directly to candidate
campaigns.25
D. Candidates as Speakers
Individual candidates (and their campaigns) spread some election lies, 26
while speakers other than those associated with a campaign do so as well.
Why might this distinction matter? Perhaps we think it fair to expect more
of candidates and their campaigns with respect to their factual assertions
about matters to which they have privileged access, such as information
about the candidate’s own credentials and experience.27 And maybe a
campaign’s lies tell us something about the character of the candidate we
are considering. On the other hand, the candidate’s own expression—
including his or her lies—furthers his or her own autonomy and selfgovernance interests.28

24. See Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 1005 (2011) (“[Large
donors] are seeking to use their wealth and intensity of commitment to exercise a greater
degree of influence over a collective, public decision than not only the vast majority of
voters, but also most other donors.”).
25. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2016) (prohibiting corporations’ campaign contributions).
26. E.g., Persily, supra note 13, at 68 (“More striking still, the official campaigns would
retweet these [false] stories. Donald Trump retweeted one suggesting that his support among
blue-collar workers was the highest for any candidate since Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Eric
Trump, Kellyanne Conway, and Corey Lewandowski all retweeted an article from a fakenews website (abcnews.com.co) which claimed that Clinton had sent hired protesters to
disrupt Trump’s rallies.”); Angie Drobnic Holan & Linda Qui, 2015 Lie of the Year: The
Campaign Misstatements of Donald Trump, POLITIFACT (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2015/dec/21/2015-lie-year-donald-trumpcampaign-misstatements/ [https://perma.cc/62ZC-6BKN] (documenting 2015 falsehoods by
the Trump campaign).
27. See Norton, Lies to Manipulate, supra note 2, at 188–89.
28. See Weinstein, supra note 11, at 226–27 (“[Regulating candidates’ lies about their
opponents] can be thought of as a basic ground rule for a fair contest analogous to a rule
prohibiting boxers from hitting each other below the belt. . . . Although a subsidiary purpose
of a candidate’s speech might sometimes be to contribute to public opinion in the hopes of
changing laws or policy, this is rarely, if ever, the primary purpose of such speech. Rather,
the dominant purpose of such expression is to influence public opinion in order to get
elected.”).
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E. Judges and Lawyers as Speakers
Ethics codes impose higher expectations of truthfulness upon certain
speakers on the campaign trail (and elsewhere). More specifically, judges
and lawyers differ from most other campaign speakers in that professional
responsibility rules govern their speech, including their lies.29 In upholding
laws that punish judicial candidates’ campaign lies, for example, courts
have emphasized the threats posed by such lies to the public’s confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary.30
F. Governmental Speakers
Sometimes the government (rather than a nongovernmental speaker) may
be the source of an election lie. Why might this matter?31 To be sure, the
government’s speech on some election issues—like ballot issues—can be of
great value to voters.32 But our own government’s election-related lies can

29. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015) (holding that
Florida’s rule prohibiting judges from engaging in speech soliciting campaign donations was
narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s compelling interest in maintaining “public
confidence in the integrity of its judiciary”).
30. See Myers v. Thompson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1141–42 (D. Mont. 2016)
(upholding Montana Code of Judicial Conduct provision that prohibits judges and judicial
candidates from making knowing or reckless falsehoods) (“Counterspeech is not a remedy to
a systemic challenge that is false and undermines the public’s confidence in the third branch
of government.”); Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 14-488 Re: Shepard, 217 So. 3d 71, 78
(Fla. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Shepard v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 737 (2018) (upholding Florida Code of Judicial Conduct provision that prohibits judicial
candidates from “knowingly misrepresent[ing] the identity, qualifications, present position
or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent”). But see Nat Stern, Judicial
Candidates’ Right to Lie, 77 MD. L. REV. 774, 776 (2018) (arguing that such prohibitions are
likely unconstitutional).
31. Recall that the Citizens United majority asserted that “the First Amendment
generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010). But this assertion failed to acknowledge
that the Court’s own doctrine often treats speakers—such as commercial speakers, students,
prisoners, and public employees—differently based on their expression’s differing potential
for harm. See id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And, of course, listeners often use a
speaker’s identity as a proxy for the message’s quality and credibility. See infra notes 60–62
and accompanying text.
32. See Helen Norton, Campaign Speech with a Twist: When the Government Is the
Speaker, Not the Regulator, 61 EMORY L.J. 209, 215–16 (2011). On the other hand, some
remain concerned that the government’s campaign-related speech—even if truthful—
threatens to coerce listeners or drown out competing speakers precisely because of the
government’s identity as the speaker. See id. at 217–25.
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be especially corrosive to a heathy democracy.33 In terms of legal remedies,
the First Amendment does not protect the government’s own speech (unlike
that of nongovernmental speakers) and the government’s speech may
instead sometimes be constrained by the Constitution itself.34
For this discussion’s purposes, “government speech” means the speech
of a governmental body (like an agency report, legislative committee report,
or legislative resolution) and the speech of an individual empowered to
speak for the government (like a President’s proclamation or a surgeon
general’s report), but not the speech of an individual employed by the
government when he or she speaks in her personal capacity.35 Incumbents’
speech, of course, can be hard to characterize because they have the
potential to speak both as governmental officials and as political candidates.
In parsing the two, I urge a functional approach that looks to the setting, the
purpose, and the likely consequences of the speech. For example, we should
be quicker to characterize an incumbent’s expression as the government’s
when the incumbent’s speech has greater coercive or other negative effect
precisely because it comes from someone who wields government power
(for instance, when it draws from the information and power advantages
that attend the government).
* * *
In sum, why might the identity of the election liar matter? First, the
nature of the speaker may shed some light on the First Amendment value, if
any, of the lie. For instance, the First Amendment sometimes protects lies
because of their value in furthering the speaker’s autonomy—as is the case,
for example, of lies told to preserve the speaker’s privacy or that enable the
speaker to choose how to portray herself to others.36 But some liars may
have less of a claim to constitutionally protected autonomy interests
precisely because of their foreign, robotic, corporate, or governmental
identity. Second, the speaker’s identity may exacerbate the threats that its
33. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 210 (“Government is in some sense a trust; there is a
special relationship between government and people, and it is a violation of this conception
for secrecy or falsehood to come between trustee and people.”); see also Norton, supra note
7, at 78–83 (describing the various ways in which the government’s lies threaten harm to the
public).
34. See Norton, supra note 7, at 96 (“[S]ome government lies about voting matters can
violate the Due Process Clause. More specifically, the government’s lies about the location
of polls or the times at which they close can deprive individuals of the meaningful exercise
of voting rights. So too could be the case of the government’s lies about candidates’ identity
or party affiliation.”).
35. Id. at 76–77.
36. See Norton, Lies and the Constitution, supra note 2, at 166.
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election lies pose to key constitutional values: think, for example, of the
threats to democratic self-governance posed by foreign or governmental
lies. With respect to possible solutions, finally, the election lies of some
speakers (such as robots) may be more amenable than others to regulation
by code, some (like corporations) to markets, some (like candidates) to
norms, and some (like government) to law. Maybe.
II. Differences Among the Motives for Election Lies
The liar’s motive may also be relevant to our assessment of the lie’s
potential harm.
A. For Political Gain
Many, if not most, election lies seek to shape election outcomes by
influencing votes for or against a specific candidate or ballot issue. These
efforts may be motivated by the liar’s belief that a given outcome will
further his or her self-interest, or perhaps the public’s interest.
B. To Avoid Legal Accountability
Some election lies instead seek to protect a candidate or campaign from
legal, rather than political, accountability. Recall the lies by various
members of the Nixon administration in the aftermath of the 1972 elections,
lies sometimes regulated by obstruction of justice laws and related
statutes.37
C. For Financial Gain
Some election lies (along with other forms of “fake news”) appear
motivated entirely by the speaker’s financial gain. As the Washington Post
and New York Times have detailed, more clicks on false or otherwise
provocative posts often mean more money for the speaker who generates
the post.38 Some suggest that a purely financial motive for an election37. See William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 458 (1999).
38. See Terrence McCoy, For the ‘New Yellow Journalists,’ Opportunity Comes in
Clicks and Bucks, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
for-the-new-yellow-journalists-opportunity-comes-in-clicks-and-bucks/2016/11/20/d58d0
36c-adbf-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html?utm_term=.650f8c55de7b (describing the
financial incentives of fake news posts); Scott Shane, How to Make a Masterpiece in Fake
News, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2017, at A1 (describing how a website operator received $1000
an hour in web advertising revenue when he posted an intentionally false story claiming that
thousands of fraudulent votes for Hillary Clinton had been found in an Ohio warehouse).
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related lie means that the lie is better characterized as unprotected fraud or
corruption than protected public discourse.39
D. To Undermine the Notion of Truth Itself
Some election lies seek not to persuade the listener that a particular false
assertion is in fact true, but instead to inculcate listeners’ cynicism and
doubt about the possibility of truth and thus undermine democratic
institutions more generally.40 Indeed, authoritarian regimes have long
spread “disinformation” for political and military ends: for example, “[t]he
fundamental purpose of dezinformatsiya, or Russian disinformation . . . is
to undermine the official version of events—even the very idea that there is
a true version of events—and foster a kind of policy paralysis.”41 Relatedly,
governmental and nongovernmental speakers alike sometimes lie about the
press and other truth-seeking institutions to discredit them in the public
eye.42 This is by no means a new—or uniquely American—phenomenon:
In countries where press freedom is restricted or under
considerable threat — including Russia, China, Turkey, Libya,
Poland, Hungary, Thailand, Somalia, and others — political
leaders have invoked “fake news” as justification for beating
back media scrutiny. . . . [T]he president’s mantra of “fake
news” stirs different concerns among many foreign politicians
and analysts, who fear it erodes public confidence in democratic
39. See TEACHOUT, supra note 9, at 276 (“Corruption describes a range of self-serving
behaviors. People are corrupt when their private interest systematically overrides public
goals in public roles, when they put their self-love ahead of group love.”).
40. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?
AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018) (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript
at
7),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992961
(“Propaganda also undermines the crucial role of deliberation and the search for truth in a
democracy. Propaganda attempts to put everything in dispute, so that nothing can be
established as true, and everything becomes a matter of personal opinion or partisan belief.
Because everything is a matter of opinion, one can assume that anything a political opponent
says can be disregarded, and that factual claims contrary to one’s own beliefs can also be
disregarded. . . . Moreover, if people stop believing in the truth of what they read, they don’t
have to think hard about political questions. Instead, they can simply make political
decisions based on identity or affiliation with their political allies. Propaganda, in other
words, undermines truth to destroy the concept of the public good and to encourage
tribalism.”).
41. Neil Farquhar, A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2bR9n3c.
42. See generally RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and
the Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301 (2017).
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institutions at a time when populism and authoritarianism are
returning in many regions.43
The harms of such truth-disrupting lies are especially pernicious, their
remedies particularly elusive.44
III. Differences in the Subject Matter of Election Lies
Election lies involve false assertions of fact about a wide variety of
matters. These differences may affect our assessment of the lies’ potential
harm as well as the prospects for their constraint.
A. Lies About the Mechanics of Voting
Lies about the mechanics of voting include lies about the dates of an
election, the location of polls, and the times at which the polls close. 45
Examples include letters and flyers instructing Republicans to vote on
Tuesdays, Democrats on Wednesdays.46 These lies also include lies about
the legal consequences of voting—for instance, false claims that individuals
in certain communities could be arrested if they try to vote.47

43. Steven Erlanger, ‘Fake News,’ Trump’s Obsession, Is Now a Cudgel for Strongmen,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2C7CEkq.
44. See Persily, supra note 13, at 69 (“The power of fake news does not derive merely
from the changed attitudes of viewers of such stories. It could also demobilize voters by
fanning cynicism regarding the candidates and the election. False stories create a blanket of
fog that obscures the real news and information communicated by the campaigns. The
available academic evidence suggests that viewers have considerable difficulty
distinguishing between real and fake news, and that trust in the media is already at an alltime low. The prevalence of false stories online erects barriers to educated political decision
making and renders it less likely that voters will choose on the basis of genuine information
rather than lies or misleading ‘spin.’”).
45. The government’s lies that deprive individuals of the meaningful exercise of voting
rights may additionally be constrained by the Due Process Clause. See Norton, supra note 7,
at 116 (“Consider first a secretary of state’s office—the office charged with administering
elections within that state—that lies to certain audiences about where polls are located or
when the polls will close in hopes of depressing their vote. Such lies are likely to prevent
some number of individuals from voting, and thus are functionally indistinguishable from
locking the doors to the polls. In other words, these lies . . . directly deprive targets of a
constitutionally protected right for reasons that will fail strict scrutiny, and thus violate the
Due Process Clause.”) (emphasis added).
46. See Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 343–46 (2010).
47. See id. at 347–48 (describing calls to voters “misinforming them that they would be
arrested if they tried to vote on Election Day and falsely reporting that their polling places
had changed”); id. at 353 (describing campaign materials “warning people found guilty of
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B. Lies About the Content of Ballot Measures
Election lies sometimes involve the content of ballot measures that take
the form of initiatives or referenda. Sometimes lies about these measures
take place before the election. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, for example,
recounts that the signature-gathering process for what was called the
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative in 2006 “became mired in allegations that
the circulators deceptively represented the initiative to voters as one that
supported affirmative action policies, while in reality it sought to limit
them.”48
Sometimes the ballot language itself includes a falsehood.49 In 2008, for
example, an Illinois appellate court ordered the Secretary of State to issue a
corrective notice in response to ballot language that falsely stated that
“THE FAILURE TO VOTE THIS BALLOT IS THE EQUIVALENT OF A
NEGATIVE VOTE.”50
C. Lies About a Candidate’s Credentials
Candidates sometimes engage in autobiographical lies about their own
credentials relevant to their competence, expertise, or trustworthiness, such
as lies about their veteran status, educational degrees, past employment, or

any infraction, including traffic tickets, to stay away from the polls or face possible
imprisonment”).
48. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an
Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009); see
also id. (describing a federal court finding that petition circulators had “engaged in a pattern
of voter fraud by deceiving voters into believing that the petition supported affirmative
action”).
49. Indeed, some state statutes and state constitutions constrain false or misleading
ballot language. Remedies can include pre-election corrective notices and occasionally even
post-election voidance of the result. See Bradley v. Hall, 251 S.W.3d 470, 472 (Ark. 1952)
(finding ballot language to be misleading in violation of state law when it enabled the
legislature to legalize new service charges but was instead described as empowering the
legislature to enact laws “to authorize, define, and limit” such charges); Advisory Op. to the
Attorney Gen. re: Indep. Nonpartisan Comm’n to Apportion Legislative & Cong. Dists., 926
So. 2d 1218, 1229 (Fla. 2006) (striking a proposed state constitutional amendment from the
ballot after concluding that the proposal violated the state’s single-subject requirement and
that the ballot summary was misleading); Ex parte Tipton, 93 S.E.2d 640, 644 (S.C. 1956)
(invalidating election results where the ballot language described a proposed state
constitutional amendment as providing a debt limitation when in fact it removed a debt
limitation).
50. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. White, 898 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
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other life experience.51 Indeed, because voters often use incumbency as a
heuristic in making voting decisions, candidates sometimes even lie about
whether they are the incumbent.52
Election lies also frequently include lies about an opponent’s credentials,
character, or other qualities. These can include defamatory lies about an
opponent (which may be actionable when accompanied by the requisite
malice),53 as well as lies that are not defamatory in a legal sense, but
nonetheless seek to exploit some voters’ bigotry to the liar’s advantage—
such as “birther” lies claiming that President Barack Obama was born in
Africa.54 Lies of this sort have long antecedents. For example, as Kathleen
Hall Jamieson describes: “A week before the election that would put
Harding in the White House, ‘An Open Letter to the Men and Women of
America’ was circulated throughout the South. The letter contained five
affidavits swearing that Warren Gamaliel Harding was ‘not a White
man.’”55

51. See Norton, Lies to Manipulate, supra note 2, at 176–90 (discussing the
constitutionality of candidates’ reputation-enhancing lies about their own credentials).
52. E.g., Treasurer of the Comm. to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 389 N.W.2d 446,
448 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (describing campaign advertisements that misrepresented the
candidate as the incumbent); Ohio Democratic Party v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 2008-Ohio4256, 2008 WL 3878364, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (upholding a statute that prohibited a
candidate’s campaign literature from using the title of an office not currently held by the
candidate); Cook v. Corbett, 446 P.2d 179, 181 (Or. 1968) (describing nonincumbent
candidate’s campaign advertisements urging voters to “re-elect” her).
53. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughten, 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989)
(upholding defamation claim by candidate for elected judicial office).
54. See Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President
Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 1, 13 (2017) (“Donald Trump entered political life by relentlessly
pushing ‘birtherism,’ the arguably racist lie that Barack Obama, the nation’s first AfricanAmerican President, was not a natural-born American citizen and so was constitutionally
barred from serving as President.”). As a comparative matter, note that the United Kingdom
prohibits campaign lies about an opponent’s “personal character or conduct.” Representation
of the People Act 1983, c. 2, § 106; see also Phil Woolas Loses Bid to Overturn Court
Decision Removing Him from Parliament, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2010), https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2010/dec/03/phil-woolas-loses-bid-overturn-court-decision
[https://perma.cc/F3QE-AERZ] (describing court’s decision to uphold a candidate’s
disqualification for falsely accusing his opponent “of wooing Islamist extremists and of not
condemning threats of violence”).
55. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS 75 (1992); see also id. at 43–44
(documenting campaign attacks on Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln that included
claims that Jackson’s mother was a prostitute and that Lincoln was a perjurer, robber, and
swindler).
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D. Lies About a Candidate’s Endorsements or Associations
Because individuals often rely on endorsements as a valuable heuristic
(or cognitive shortcut) for their voting decisions,56 election lies frequently
include lies about who has endorsed the liar—or about who has endorsed
the liar’s opponent. Joseph McCarthy, for example, infamously and
successfully fabricated lies of this sort: “In the senatorial election of 1952,
[McCarthy] ran a vicious campaign against Millard Tydings, the
Democratic candidate from Maryland, printing a fake photo of Tydings
shaking hands with Earl Browder, the leader of the American Communist
Party. Tydings lost by forty thousand votes.”57 Along the same lines, “in
1962 a group in California published a pamphlet showing incumbent
governor Pat Brown bowing deferentially to Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev. The photo was fake,” and “the original had shown Brown
bowing to a visiting Laotian child.”58 More recently, voting guides in
Maryland falsely claimed that certain prominent African Americans and
well-known Democrats had endorsed various Republican candidates.59
E. Lies About the Source of Speech
Listeners often use the source of speech as a proxy for its quality and
credibility.60 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the value of such

56. See Norton, supra note 32, at 247 (explaining that “knowledge of the opinions of
trusted–or distrusted–third parties, who might include experts, community leaders, and
government speakers” are among the most effective of voter heuristics).
57. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 380 (2004); see
also Note, Avoidance of an Election or Referendum When the Electorate Has Been Misled,
70 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1084 & nn.57–58 (1957) (describing a short-lived Senate committee
proposal in response to this incident that would have prohibited all types of “composite”
photographs). These sorts of lies are related to forgeries, which are lies about the source of
speech. See infra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
58. JAMIESON, supra note 55, at 47. When Democrats produced the photo’s negative,
the state Republican party repudiated the ad—another important remedial possibility. Id.
59. Daniels, supra note 46, at 344.
60. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 592–97 (2008) (describing how individuals use the source of
speech as a heuristic for its credibility or lack thereof); Adam J. Berinsky, This Is How You
Stop Fake News, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/28/this-is-how-you-stop-fake-news/?utm_term=.fc9a2d338a87
(“Just as important as how a rumor is debunked is who does the debunking. Politicians who
support good public policy by speaking against their partisan interests – in this case,
Republicans speaking out against the death panel rumors – are considered credible sources
by citizens across the ideological spectrum. When fighting ‘fake news,’ politicians and the

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

132

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:117

information to listeners, upholding campaign speech regulations that
require the truthful disclosure of the source of certain campaign
communications and contributions.61
To exploit the value of a message’s perceived source to listeners, many
election lies involve deceptive aliases and sometimes even outright
forgeries to confuse or deceive voters about a communication’s actual
origins.62 For instance, as I’ve written elsewhere, “some speakers seek to
use pseudonyms that disguise the source of political contributions or
communications, and such pseudonyms are occasionally sufficiently
deceptive that we might at times even think of them as a type of lie.”63
These sorts of election-related lies about the source of speech also have a
long pedigree.64 As described by Kathleen Hall Jamieson:
media should present the right authority. In our politically polarized time, we may be able to
harness the power of partisanship to stop the spread of misinformation.”).
61. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“[D]isclosure permits citizens
and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This
transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages.”).
62. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 3, at 20 (describing Senator Birch Bayh’s report of “a
1972 incident in which the Committee to Re-Elect the President forged a letter on the
stationery of Democratic Senator Edward Muskie that ‘accused Senators Humphrey and
Jackson,’ against whom he was competing in the Democratic presidential primary” of legal
and other misconduct); Eileen Sullivan, Schumer Files Police Report After Fraudulent
Document Emerges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/
us/politics/schumer-fraudulent-document-harassment.html (describing how U.S. Senator
Charles Schumer filed a report with the Capitol Police upon the emergence of a fraudulent
document “which looks like a court filing” that “described false allegations” against the
senator). For a thoughtful discussion of the unique harms posed by forgeries, see Marc J.
Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 59, 110 (2018)
(concluding that, in order to address these harms, “scholars and jurists should at least explore
adding the following addendum to the framework from United States v. Alvarez: where false
statements do not merely state false facts, but are also given in a form that carries with it
indicia for reliability (such as a falsified newspaper or video or audio tape), the government
should have greater power to regulate than it typically has to regulate false words”).
63. Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J. L. & POL. 641, 642 (2012); see
also id. at 644 (“[S]ome political speakers seek to shape their listeners’ voting behavior by
denying those listeners information about the source of the message or of the candidate’s (or
cause’s) financial support – information that is not only indisputably true but also of great
interest and value to listeners.”).
64. See MICHAEL KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP 404, 409 (2016) (“Both sides [in the
debate over the Constitution’s ratification] also published fake letters and essays in the
newspapers. For example, Federalists in Pennsylvania published a fictitious letter
purportedly written by Daniel Shays, the leader of the Massachusetts debtors’ rebellion, that
was addressed to Philadelphia Antifederalists and urged them to ‘write letters to the frontier
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The “Council of White Citizens of Atlanta” sent letters from
Atlanta to 6000 black voters in Detroit in the presidential
campaign of 1956. The message: Vote Democratic “because the
Democratic Party keeps the colored in their place.” After the
election was over, investigative reporters learned that the
Council was a fabrication of a Detroit adman who was doing
volunteer work for Michigan Minutemen for Eisenhower.65
More recently, Michael Kang explained that
Interest groups strategically obscure their involvement when
they believe identification would hurt their campaigns. Many
industry groups form political committees to conduct campaign
activities under nondescript names like “Californians for
Paycheck Protection” (religious conservatives supporting
limitations on labor union political activity), “Alliance to
Revitalize California” (Silicon Valley executives supporting a
tort reform measure), and “Californians for Affordable and
Reliable Electrical Service” (industry opponents of utility
regulation).66
Newer manifestations include websites that deceive readers about their
true origins. According to the Los Angeles Times, during the 2014 election
cycle the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) “created
nearly 20 websites appearing to support Democratic candidates in all but
the small print . . . that include[d] donation forms that accept credit cards
and encourage viewers to contribute up to $500, but instead of money going
to the Democratic candidates, it goes to the NRCC.”67
counties, where the people [are] most easily deceived, and alarm them with a number of hard
words, such as aristocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, and the like, none of which they will
understand.’ Antifederalists used the same device. Madison, referring to ‘an arrant forgery’
in the newspapers reporting that John Jay had become an opponent for ratification,
complained to Washington that ‘tricks of this sort are not uncommon with the enemies of the
new Constitution’. . . In Pennsylvania, Federalist publishers went so far as to deliberately
distort the published account of the state ratifying convention’s debates to make it appear as
if the Constitution had been unopposed there.”).
65. JAMIESON, supra note 55, at 80.
66. Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence
Through Heuristic Cues and ‘Disclosure Plus,’ 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1158–59 (2003).
67. Daniel Rothberg, Republican Party Wing Creates 18 Fake Websites for Democrats,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pnrepublican-fake-websites-democrats-20140207-story.html
[https://perma.cc/D735-CS6F];
see also Hasen, supra note 3, at 71 (“[A] state should be able to stop a person from falsely

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

134

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:117

F. Lies About Policy-Related Facts
Lies about policy-related matters include falsehoods about the facts that
support, or undermine, a candidate’s policy platform or a ballot initiative—
such as lies about data on immigration, unemployment, crime, and more.68
Once again, these efforts are by no means new. Kathleen Hall Jamieson
describes nineteenth-century election lies charging “that Andrew Jackson
had executed Tennessee militiamen without trial and without cause. In
1960, Kennedy tagged the Republicans with responsibility for a missile gap
that he could not find once he assumed office.”69 More recently, Jamieson
describes how candidate David Duke
used national interview time to insinuate false claims into public
consciousness. Unchallenged on either “Larry King Live” or
“Nightline” was Duke’s assertion that the U.S. Post Office drops
the test scores of whites and elevates them for blacks. A
spokesperson for the U.S. Post Office categorically denies that
statement saying that the only score alterations are for veterans
who receive an extra five points and disabled veterans who
receive ten.70
* * *
Why might the differences among the topics of election lies matter in
thinking about whether and (if so) how to address them? Some election lies
representing identity in an election context with the aim of defrauding donors of their
money. For example, a group cannot falsely claim it is raising money for a candidate’s
campaign but then use the money for a different purpose. Falsely representing yourself as a
representative of a candidate, party or committee for financial gain seems well within the
type of anti-fraud law that it appears all on the Court accept as constitutionally
permissible.”). Rightly or wrongly, laws that punish lies intended to manipulate the target’s
financial decisions are considerably less constitutionally controversial than lies intended to
manipulate his or her voting decisions. See Norton, Lies and the Constitution, supra note 2,
at 189–92.
68. E.g., Adam Davidson, The Financial Page: Trump’s Abuse of Government Data,
NEW YORKER (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/03/trumpsabuse-of-government-data (“Sean Spicer said at a press briefing that the President wanted to
make clear that the unemployment rate ‘may have been phony in the past, but it’s very real
now.’ . . . The danger is that a President who disparages the data might convince his
followers that bad economic news is political propaganda, and offer numbers that have no
statistical rigor behind them.”; see also Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of
Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175 (2018) (describing warring facts about public
policy, abortion, climate change, vaccines, immigration, and voter fraud).
69. JAMIESON, supra note 55, at 45.
70. Id. at 155.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/6

2018]

THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT ELECTION LIES

135

involve false assertions that threaten especially direct harm: think, for
example, about lies about the mechanics of voting that effectively deter or
prevent some individuals from voting altogether. Some—like lies about the
source of a message—involve factual assertions that are more objectively
verifiable than others, perhaps lessening concerns that their legal regulation
will chill valuable speech or invite partisan enforcement.71
IV. Differences in the Timing of Election Lies
Most of the lies described so far occur before an election. But some take
place afterward to achieve purposes apart from influencing a campaign’s
outcome.
A. Post-Election Lies About the Other Side’s Campaign
These include lies falsely alleging an opponent’s misconduct, perhaps to
divert attention from other matters.72 For example, in response to growing
concerns about his campaign’s connections to Russia, President Trump
falsely claimed that then-President Obama had wiretapped him during the
2016 presidential campaign.73

71. Note that, in the context of union representation elections, the National Labor
Relations Board regulates forgeries but not other campaign lies. See Midland Nat’l Life Ins.
Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 132 (1982) (“[W]e will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of the
parties’ campaign statements, and we will not set elections aside on the basis of misleading
campaign statements. We will, however, intervene where a party has used forged documents
which render the voters unable to recognize propaganda for what it is.”); Helen Norton,
Truth and Lies in the Workplace, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 42 (2016) (“The [National Labor
Relations Board] now sets aside election results on the basis of lies deemed noncoercive
only when they take the form of lies about who is responsible for certain election-related
speech (i.e., forgery) and not those that involve other deliberate misrepresentations of fact or
law.”).
72. See JAMIESON, supra note 55, at 205 (“Candidates divert public and press attention
from legitimate issues by calculated strategies of distraction.”).
73. See David Shepardson, Trump Claims Obama Wiretapped Him During Campaign;
Obama Refutes It, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2017, 8:05AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-trump-obama/trump-claims-obama-wiretapped-him-during-campaign-obama-refutes-itidUSKBN16B0CC [https://perma.cc/JX4P-DGSX]. The Department of Justice later
acknowledged the absence of any evidence for Trump’s claim. See Nina Burleigh, Trump’s
Claim That Obama Wiretapped His Campaign Is False: U.S. Department of Justice,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 2, 2017, 12:49 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-russiainvestigation-wiretap-fbi-obama-658888; Deirde Walsh, Justice Department: No Evidence
Trump Tower Was Wiretapped, CNN: POLITICS (Sept. 3, 2017, 5:50PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2017/09/02/politics/justice-department-trump-tower-wiretap/index.html.
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B. Post-Election Lies About Voter Fraud
Like many other election lies, deliberate or reckless falsehoods alleging
widespread voter fraud have a long history.74 Most recently, President
Trump claimed—without evidence—that “[i]n addition to winning the
Electoral College in a landslide, I won the popular vote if you deduct the
millions of people who voted illegally” and “[s]erious voter fraud in
Virginia, New Hampshire and California – so why isn’t the media reporting
on this? Serious bias – big problem!”75 If such lies lead to legal changes that
effectively disenfranchise certain voters, they threaten especially pernicious
harms.76

74. See ERIC BURNS, INFAMOUS SCRIBBLERS: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE ROWDY
BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 377 (2006) (recounting that Thomas Jefferson
encouraged pamphleteer and journalist James Callender’s claim that John Adams had
engaged in voter fraud).
75. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 27, 2016, 12:30 PM),
http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov.
27, 2016, 4:31 PM), http://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump. Studies refute the charge.
CHRISTOPHER FARMIGHETTI ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NONCITIZEN VOTING: THE
MISSING MILLIONS 1 (2017) (finding that election officials referred only approximately thirty
incidents of suspected noncitizen voting for further investigation or prosecution out of 23.5
million votes cast in the 2016 election, and that forty out of forty-two jurisdictions studied
reported no known incidents of noncitizen voting); see also Editorial, Trump’s Commission
on Voter Fraud Is, Well, Fraudulent, WASH. POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-commission-on-voter-fraud-is-well-fraudulent/2017/
05/17/e6ffc564-39ae-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html?utm_term=.c50ce77ef92d
(“Multiple studies have shown, and the overwhelming consensus of both Republican and
Democratic voting officials at the state and local levels has been, that fraudulent voting,
particularly of the in-person variety, is all but nonexistent in the United States. A thorough
survey three years ago came up with 31 credible instances of voter impersonation that could
have been prevented by ID laws, out of more than 1 billion votes cast in elections from 2000
to 2014.”).
76. See Veasey v. Abbott, 265 F. Supp. 3d 684, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding that
Texas law requiring voter identification must be eliminated “‘root and branch’ . . . as the law
has no legitimacy” because of a lack of evidence of in-person voter impersonation fraud);
Editorial, Why Does Donald Trump Lie About Voter Fraud?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/opinion/why-does-donald-trump-lie-about-voterfraud.html (“This is how voter suppression efforts start. First come the unverified tales of
fraud; then come the urgent calls to tighten voter registration rules and increase ‘ballot
security,’ which translate into laws that disenfranchise tens or hundreds of thousands of
qualified voters.”).
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V. Differences in the Means of Transmission
We can also categorize election lies by their means of transmission, as
technology can sometimes exacerbate their harm. A quarter-century ago,
Kathleen Hall Jamieson bemoaned television’s effects on the quality and
integrity of campaign discourse.77 Today, Twitter’s abbreviated format
invites outrageous and often false assertions. More generally, social media
rewards popularity rather than truth—and falsity is often very popular. As
Nathaniel Persily observed:
The power (if any) of fake news is determined by the virality
of the lie that it propagates, by the speed with which it is
disseminated without timely contradiction, and consequently by
how many people receive and believe the falsehood. As with
other information or rumors in the offline world, many factors
can drive a story’s popularity: its entertainment value, novelty,
salaciousness, and the like. But the pace with which lies can
travel in the online world is much greater, and different
strategies and technologies, such as automated social-media bots,
can spread those lies to the right people.
....
. . . The “search for truth” is necessarily far down the list of
priorities for the social network, just as it is for its users, who
will often find false, negative, bigoted, or other outrageous
speech to be more meaningful and engaging.78

77. JAMIESON, supra note 55, at 9–10 (“But television has granted the manufacturers of
campaign discourse some Svengalian powers that print and radio lacked. Specifically, its
visual capacity couples with an ability to reconfigure ‘reality’ in ways that heighten the
power of the visceral appeal. Its multimodal nature makes analytic processing of rapidly
emerging claims all but impossible. And its status as entertaining wallpaper grants television
the privilege of surrounding us with claims that education has taught us to reject were they
lodged on the printed page. Finally, on both radio and television, the identity of the unseen
voice-over announcer is unknown and in that anonymity not accountable in any useful for
the claims he or she insinuates into our consciousness.”).
78. Persily, supra note 13, at 70, 74; see also id. at 68 (“Over the campaign’s final three
months, the twenty top-performing false election stories generated more engagement than
did the twenty top stories featured by mainstream news outlets. . . . The prevalence of false
stories online erects barriers to educated political decision making and renders it less likely
that voters will choose on the basis of genuine information rather than lies or misleading
‘spin.’”).
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VI. Differences in Audiences
We can also sort election lies by their audience, which again might
inform our assessment of the lies’ potential harm. Many election lies, of
course, are directed towards voters. Indeed, liars can increasingly tailor and
target their messages to specific voters to maximize their potential for
successfully deceiving their audience.79 Sometimes voters themselves lie to
others. Voters’ lies to the government about certain matters constitute fraud,
for example, and are regulated by law in a variety of ways.80 Some election
lies have altogether different audiences. Some, for example, specifically
target the press in hopes of fooling it and thus undermining its credibility in
the public’s eyes. Examples include recent efforts to trick the Washington
Post into publishing a false report about U.S. Senate candidate Roy Moore
in apparent hopes of discrediting the newspaper.81
79. See Levi, supra note 18, at 26 (“One important element in the dangerous mosaic
implicated by ‘fake news’ in the digital environment is the ability to target individual voters
or desired groups of voters. This allows the speaker to tailor political disinformation to
particular voters’ or groups’ emotional and/or cognitive biases and weaknesses . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10307(c) (2012) (prohibiting a voter’s lie regarding
“information as to his name, address or period of residence in the voting district for the
purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or vote”); id. § 10307(d) (prohibiting voters
from falsifying or concealing any material fact, or making any false statement,
representation, writing, or document); see also Benson, supra note 48, at 6 (quoting U.S.
ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL REVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE STUDY 13–14 (2016)) (describing examples of voters’ lies to
include “[s]igning a name other than his or her own[,] . . . [v]oting or attempting to vote
more than once[,] . . . [r]egistering to vote without being entitled to register,” and
“knowingly making a materially false statement on an application for voter registration”)
(quotation marks omitted). Professor Benson distinguishes lies by voters from lies to voters
as the difference between “voter fraud” and “election fraud,” or the difference between
“voter-initiated” and “voter-targeted” lies. See id. at 6. Elsewhere I have noted the
discomfort created by a legal regime that prohibits lies about and to, but not by, the
government. Norton, Lies to Manipulate, supra note 2, at 91–92. Here too we might worry
about a legal regime that is often considerably quicker to punish alleged lies by voters to the
government than lies by the government (and by those who want to become the government)
to voters.
81. See Shawn Boburg, Aaron C. Davis & Alice Crites, A Woman Approached the Post
with Dramatic – and False – Tale About Roy Moore. She Appears to Be Part of Undercover
Sting Operation, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/a-woman-approached-the-post-with-dramatic--and-false--tale-about-roymoore-sje-appears-to-be-part-of-undercover-sting-operation/2017/11/27/0c2e335a-cfb611e7-9d3a-bcbe2af58c3a_story.html?utm_term=.e727h; see also Rachel Maddow, Rachel
Maddow’s Urgent Warning to the Rest of the Media, WASH. POST (July 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/07/07/rachel-maddows-urgent-
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Conclusion
In offering this long—yet no doubt incomplete—litany of falsehoods, I
don’t propose to solve the problem of election lies. I hope instead to show
that election lies pose many problems, plural. As we have seen, for
example, some may threaten greater or more direct harm than others, and
some may be more responsive to different forms of constraint than others.
More specifically, a better understanding of the various types of election
lies, their dangers, and (perhaps) their value may shed light on whether and
when norms, markets, or architecture may be better situated than law to
address them (or vice versa). In other words, the variety and complexity of
the problem of election lies require nuanced and diverse responses that
recognize the harms of various lies as well as the challenges posed by
efforts to constrain them.

warning-to-the-rest-of-the-media/?utm_term=.b213f973edfa (describing warning to other
reporters to watch out for “bogus” news reports apparently intended to discredit the
reputation of the reporter).
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